[Reports Presented at 2001 FRFANZ Conference]
BARRY BRIDGES
INITIAL ATTACK ‑ Significant Fire, Boxing Day, 2000, Blenheim
Conditions
Barry Bridges, MarIborough DC PRFO, outlined
conditions prevailing before the outbreak of fire. There had been good spring
growth, but rainfall was much less than average in Nov/Dec. Temperatures were
higher than average. On the two days 25/26 Dec., these were 29% and even at
temperature was stable at around 24o in the north‑facing Withers
Hills. Relative humidity on the 26th
dropped to 40%, and the DC in the Awatere Valley was 581. All
firefighting resources were on alert.
Initial Attack 26
December
Barry is also Blenheim CFO. The first fire call of the morning was to
the Waihopai Valley, 35 km from Blenheim. While he was responding, a second
call was received at 1056 to Ward, about 60 km south of Blenheim. Barry
continued to Waihopai, and this fire was contained at about 20 ha. Blenheims
DCF0 responded to Ward, and helicopters were dispatched to assist there.
On returning from Waihopai, Barry heard the
calls to a fire on the Taylor Rd at 1601. He ordered a tanker to respond, and
got his first glimpse of smoke while still 12 km away when passing through
Renwick. On arrival, the fire was still on the flat, threatening houses on the
left flank. Appliances were sent in to deal with this flank, and the tanker
with spray boom sent in on the right to prevent the fire reaching the Wither
Hills, and a popular walking track. At this point, he had thought that it was
possible to cut the fire off. However, the fire spotted 100m ahead, and into
the hills, and was lost.
Fire Behaviour
Fire researcher Grant Pearce said
that the ISI in the Awatere Valley was 40.5 (47.9 at Woodbourne air field) on
the day. Grass on the Wither Hills was 95‑100% cured and the loading was
2.5‑7 t/ha. It was higher at Ward. There was therefore the potential for
head fire intensities of 18,500 kW/m, and a rate of spread of 10 kph on level
ground. At a 10o slope. the ROS would climb to 16.4 kph, and the
intensity to 41,000 kW/m.
Change of Tactics
With the Hills alight, Barry's immediate
concern was for trampers on the walkway, and the protection of property. There
was no information on how many may have been up there, although there were two
cars parked in the walkway carpark. He dispatched a 4WD up the hill to look,
and demanded two helicopters from the Ward fire. The first helicopter picked
two walkers off the hill, and a third managed to make his own way down. The
fire was making rapid progress in a NW direction to the State Highway. It
jumped and would ultimately be stopped by the sea. 100's of volunteers were
turning out, most dressed for the hot temperatures in shorts and singlets.
Refusal caused much criticism. Helicopters were ordered in from Wellington and,
in the heat of the moment, fixed‑wing aircraft were ignored although they
were readily available. Only the flanks of the fire could be worked on, and
contact with crews became very stretched. SAR arrived with a communications
vehicle, but this was incompatible. Aside from property protection (no houses
were lost), ground operations focused on heavy machinery to cut breaks. These
worked reasonably well, although the roll‑over was to cause lingering
problems. The head of the fire kept charging on, jumping roads. Helicopters
were stood down overnight, but bulldozers worked through.
TONY TEELING
CIMS APPLICATION ‑ Significant Fire, Boxing Day, 2000, Blenheim
The Marlborough fire situation was being
monitored by the NRFA and an offer to put an IMT in to assist the MDC was
accepted at 2000. John Barnes said that it was difficult getting hold of team
members because of the. holiday period. The team - John, Chris Milsom. Tony
Teeling and local Vern Harris ‑ began work at 0830 next morning. The IMT
had to start from scratch in setting up an organization. The Blenheirn CD HQ
was chosen as ICP, and locals were used to staff positions below the IMT. The
situation was that there were two major fires with a forecast of continuation
of hot, dry weather. 16 organisations were involved with 30 people at the ICP
and 250‑300 firefighters. 11 helicopters and 4 fixed‑wing aircraft
were available. Forestry blocks had been destroyed, 16 pastoral farms were
damaged, 200‑250 km fenceline destroyed, 2000 sheep and 50 cattle lost.
Roadblocks were in force, and life and property remained under threat.
The experience of the IMT ‑ two of the
members had earlier been part of the Anzac contingent to the US saw a quick
implementation of CIMS. For instance, Wellington RFA's were being requested for
crews, by 0900. Rain overnight on the
27/28 helped in gaining control of the fires. Control was handed back to the
MDC on the 29th, starting at 1300. Points that arose:
availability of volunteer firefighters for long duration incidents
lack of experienced communications officers
availability of buildings for use as ICP's ‑ should be regional
centres previously selected
need for experienced personnel to fill roles
agreements/protocols/delegations associated with getting IMTs in
CIMS training required at all levels
shadowing roles for new IMT members to learn
lead agency needs to fill finance role
dealing with untrained volunteers
liability issues
CIMS Assessment
This was
the first of several CIMS implementations for the season. At the Cora Lynn
(Cant.) fire, an IMT and firefighters again came from the North Island, with an
EOC being set up in Christchurch. Tony Teeling has been specialising in
strategy, and this means ideally looking ahead 24 and 48 hours. He pointed out
that CIMS is still developing in NZ; some observations:
we all own CIMS
the roles beneath the IMT members lack definition
we need commitment to train in CIMS
agencies must co‑ordinate
we must scutinise performance
there is a modern focus with regard to liability
CIMS will enable recurring debrief issues to be rectified